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We investigate the effects of competition on managerial incentives and effort in a laboratory 
experiment.  Each  owner  offers  compensation  to  his  manager  in  two  different  contexts: 
monopoly and Cournot duopoly. After accepting the compensation, the manager chooses an 
effort level to increase the probability of reduced costs of his firm. Theory predicts that the 
entry  of  a  rival  firm  in  a  monopolistic  industry  affects  negatively  both  the  incentive 
compensation and the effort level. Our experimental findings confirm that the entry of a 
rival firm reduces the incentive compensation but not the manager’s effort level. However, 
despite the reduction of the incentive compensation, the manager continues to accept the 
contract offers and exert the same level of effort. 
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1.  Introduction 
The relation between a firm’s competitive environment and his internal incentives is still 
unclear. Some papers showed that in a competitive market firms might distort the incentives 
of their managers in order to affect product market competition (Fershtman and Judd (1987) 
and Skilvas (1987)). The firm can therefore use managerial incentives to guide the behavior 
of his manager on the market. In this respect, managerial incentives are important strategic 
instruments that enable firms to influence market competition. But just the reverse logic 
may hold: product market competition may affect firm’s internal incentives. The issue of 
optimum incentives in a context of competing  firms has been addressed parsimoniously 
both by the theoretical and the empirical literature. Since the seminal papers by Hart (1983) 
and  Holmstrom  (1982),  an  abundant  theoretical  literature  on  optimum  incentives  has 
developed. The large bulk of this literature concentrates on optimum incentives schemes in 
an “isolated firm” (see Gibbons (1998) and Prendergast (1999) for reviews). Few papers 
address the issue  of  how a firm’s owner  should  design the  contract for his manager  to 
account efficiently for competition by rival firms.     
The main difficulty, both from a theoretical and empirical point of view, it that competition 
affects at the same time the firm’s profit, the incentives provided to the manager and the 
manager’s effort. Competition can affect directly each of these variables, and since they are 
related,  any  direct  impact  on  one  of  them,  indirectly  affects  the  others.  For  instance, 
suppose that managers react directly by increasing their effort. Their reaction will feed back 
on the firm’s profit and therefore on the manager’s incentives. Suppose that competition 
affects  directly  the  firm’s  profit.  Expecting  that,  the  owner  will  provide  higher  or  lower 
incentives to his manager who will adjust her level of effort. Because of that, an increase in 
product market competition has actually an ambiguous effect on managerial incentives. On 
the one hand, under harsher competition, profit expectations are lower, and firm owners 
might  be  tempted  to  offer  smaller  bonuses  to  their  managers.  On  the  other  hand,  as 
competition becomes fiercer, firm owners may be encouraged to offer larger bonuses to 
successful  managers  because  successful  cost-reductions  for  instance,  increase  the  firm’s 
market  share  and  the  owner’s  profits.  The  theoretical  literature  clearly  favors  the  first 
scenario (Martin (1993), Horn et al., (1994), Schmidt (1997)). However Raith (2003) showed 3 
that the second scenario can arise under plausible hypotheses. Empirical evidence is very 
parsimonious and disputable.  
The  few  papers  which  dealt  with  the  relation  between  incentives  and  competition 
investigated three main issues: (i) the change in information structure induced by increased 
competitive pressure, (ii) the impact on the manager’s effort choice, (iii) the impact on the 
incentive schemes. 
(i)  Holmstrom (1982), Hart (1983), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), Scharfstein (1988) and 
Hermalin  (1992)  rely  on  the  fact  that  competition  modifies  the  principal’s  information 
structure  about  managerial  effort.  The  principal  can  therefore  take  into  account  the 
additional information to design the incentives scheme offered to the manager. However, 
increased competition has  an ambiguous effect and depends  crucially  on the managers’ 
utility function. If the manager is infinitely risk-averse (Hart, 1983), he provides more effort 
under harsher competition, allowing the principal to exert any level of effort at reduced cost. 
Competition is therefore a substitute to the incentives. However, under the more realistic 
assumption of bounded risk-aversion (Scharfstein, 1988) competition will increase the cost 
of exerting effort from the manager.  
(ii)   Competition  has  a  direct  impact  on  managers’  effort  choice  (Hermalin  (1992), 
Schmidt (1997)) because of the threat of losing the bonus, or worse, being fired. The effect is 
non-ambiguous:  managers  react  to  increased  competition  by  raising  their  effort  level  in 
order to prevent bad performance.  
Competition affects indirectly the incentives provided by the firm’s owner depending on the 
impact on the firm’s profit (Hermalin (1992), Martin (1993), Horn et al. (1994), Schmidt 
(1997),  Raith  (2003),  Baggs  and  Bettignies  (2007)).  The  principal  increases  (lowers)  the 
incentives if the profit raises (falls) and the manager adjust her effort accordingly. However, 
as shown in Raith (2003), the alteration of the competitive environment affects the industry 
equilibrium as a whole, since the number of firms, the cost structure and the effort levels are 
affected.  
Several empirical papers deal with the issue. In their seminal paper Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) found only a weak correlation between the manager’s compensation scheme and the 4 
firm’s  performance.  Accordingly,  since  owners’  contract  offers  to  their  manager  are 
independent  of  the  firm’s  performance,  competitive  pressure  should  not  be  an  issue. 
However, Hall and Liebman (1998) found a strong and positive correlation between firms’ 
performance  and  managers’  compensation.  A  few  papers  (Nickell  (1996),  Beiner  et  al. 
(2009), Baggs et al. (2007)) studied the effect of competition. These papers focused on the 
impact on incentives, productivity and agency costs. Their main findings can be summarized 
as follows: increasing competition on the product market has a positive effect on employees’ 
productivity (Nickell, 1996), on managers’ incentives (Beiner et al., 2009) and a negative 
effect on agency costs (Jagannathan and Srinivasan, 1999). While these findings contrast 
with  the  theoretical  predictions,  there  are  several  important  methodological  issues  that 
preclude  a  credible  conclusion.  In  particular  it  is  difficult  to  observe  and  measure 
meaningfully a change in competitive pressure or in the level of effort of the managers.  
Even if the variation of competitive pressure could be isolated, the data on incentives and 
efforts, are usually concealed, in particular because we consider the theoretical case were 
effort is not observable! 
In order to overcome the above limitations, it is useful to rely on experimental methods 
which can produce the data that are relevant for the analysis. In this paper, we set up a 
controlled  environment  which allows us to observe precisely and without ambiguity the 
effects  of  a  change  in  the  competitive  environment  on  owners  contract  offers  and  on 
managers’ effort choices. We compare a monopoly situation to a duopoly situation. The 
monopoly was chosen because it corresponds to the standard theoretical case where the 
incentives do not depend on the competitive environment. We compare the monopolistic 
firm to a Cournot duopoly, based on a simple model from which we derive non-ambiguous 
predictions. Managers can choose a level of effort which determines the probability of a 
cost-reducing innovation. The model predicts that increased competition lowers the firm’s 
incentives and the managers’ level of effort.  
We designed a within-subject experiment to study the effect of increased competition. In a 
first sequence the firm has no rival and we can therefore observe the incentives and the 
manager effort choice without competition. In a second sequence a second firm enters into 
the market. We can therefore observe how principals react by adjusting their incentives and 
consequently  how  agents  adjust  their  effort.  We  control  for  order  effects  by  running  a 5 
second treatment where the ordering of sequences is reversed. Our main findings are as 
follows: duopoly firms offer lower incentives than monopolistic firms, but managers accept 
the  contract  offers  and  maintain  their  effort  level  despite  the  reduced  incentives.  
Furthermore,  managers  tend  to  choose  effort  levels  that  induce  an  equal  split  of  the 
expected surplus of the contract offer.  
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  the  theoretical 
predictions. Section 3 describes the experimental procedure. Section 4 contains the results. 
The first part of Section 4 analyses the principals’ contract offers. In the second part of 
Section 4, we analyses in detail the agents’ decisions. Section 5 gives a summary. 
2.  Theoretical background 
In this section we provide a theoretical background that will be useful for framing the design 
of our experiment. We introduce a simple model that allows us to  compare managerial 
incentives under monopolistic and competitive market structures. We restrict the analysis to 
the comparison of such incentives between a monopolistic firm and a Cournot duopoly on 
the product market. We first introduce the timing of the game for the duopoly case, before 
discussing the outcomes for the monopoly and the duopoly case.  
Assumptions 
Consider a market with 2 firms, i and j, producing a homogenous product and facing a linear 
demand function,           –   where               . The number of active firms in the 
market is either one (monopoly) or two (duopoly). Each firm is an agency that is composed 
of a single principal (the owner) and a single agent (the manager). The manager’s effort 
affects the firm’s marginal cost. We assume that for each firm, it can take one of two values: 
    (low)  or      (high),  with             .  Initially,  each  firm  faces  the  high  cost  level,    . 
Managers can decide to make costly efforts that increase the probability of a successful 
innovation that reduces the firm’s marginal cost. The chosen effort is not observable by the 
principal. 
We  assume  that  agents  and  principals  are  both  risk-neutral.  Principals  maximize  their 
expected profit by offering a compensation scheme (     ) to their agent, where    is the 
agent’s compensation if the cost is low and    his compensation if the cost is high. Given 6 
that the compensation scheme is accepted agents choose a costly effort level that increases 
the probability that the cost is low. Principal i’s ex post payoff is    
              , where     
is the profit realized by firm i in state         while     is the corresponding transfer to the 
agent defined by the compensation scheme. The agent’s ex post utility function is additively 
separable and depends on his monetary payment,   , and on the cost of effort :      
    –     . We assume              
 
   , that is choosing a level of effort is identical to 
choosing a probability of success of a cost reducing innovation (i.e. that the marginal cost is 
low).  
2.1  Timing of the game 
The timing of the game involves 4 successive stages, as follows: 
Stage 1: each principal announces privately a compensation scheme (     ) to her agent, 
where         is the bonus in case of successful cost-reducing innovation. 
Stage  2:  each  agent  decides  whether  to  accept  or  reject  the  proposed  compensation 
scheme. In case of a rejection, the game is over and both the agent and the principal earn 
zero. If he accepts the compensation scheme, the agent moves to stage 3.   
Stage  3:  The  agent  chooses  the  probability              that  the  firm’s  marginal  cost  be 
reduced, with a cost of effort       
 
   . 
Stage 4: the innovation success is determined stochastically according to the probability 
chosen by the agent in stage 3: with probability p the cost will be low. The realized marginal 
costs become common knowledge and firms compete “￠ la Cournot” on the product market.  
2.2  Monopoly payoffs 
Since  the  monopolistic  firm  faces  the  whole  market  demand,  it’s  profit  is  given  by:  
        –   –    , where             and       is output. The monopoly profit is maximized 
at output       
  –  
  , which yields a profit         
  –  
   
 
. The monopoly profit is then given 
by       
  –   
   
 
 if the cost is high and        
  –   
   
 
 if the cost is low. It will be useful to 
define              the expected surplus that the monopoly can realize if its marginal cost 
is reduced. 7 
Assumption 1.    
 
   .     
Assumption 1 ensures that the level of effort under monopoly is strictly inferior to 1. The 
principal chooses a dual option      ,            , which solves: 
                                                      (1) 
subject to: 
                                                   (IC) 
                                    (IR) 
      , for                      (WC) 
IC, IR and WC are the incentive compatibility constraint, the individual rationality constraint 
and  the  wealth  constraint  respectively.  As  usual,  the  active  constraints  at  the  optimum 
solution are (IC) and (WC), so that the optimal contract that solves the above second best 





   




     
    
  
 
   
  
  
            (2) 
In the monopoly firm, the principal offers no compensation if the marginal cost is high, but if 
the marginal cost is low, he offers a bonus that increases with the expected surplus of the 
cost-reduction1. Assumption 1 guarantees that the level of effort (p) chosen by the agent in 
the monopoly case is strictly lower than 1. 
2.3  Duopoly payoffs 
Assume  now  that  there  are  two  (initially  symmetric)  firms,  identified  by  i  and  j.  Under 
Cournot competition the profit of firm is given by:                    . Equilibrium outputs 
and  profits  are             
 
               ,  and             
 
                ,  for         
       , and symmetrically for firm j. Firm i’s profit is then given by      
 
    –     if both 
cost are high,      
 
    –     if both cost are low,      
 
    –           if cost of firm i is 
                                                           
1 Schmidt (1997) analyzes a model where the manager supports a cost of work investigation,  , if the firm is 
liquidated with a probability  . He shows that the manager obtains zero compensation when marginal cost is 
high and            when marginal cost is low. If the cost of search for the work is equal to zero in the 
Schmidt’s model, the result is the same. 8 
high and cost of firm j is low and       
 
    –           if cost of firm i is low and cost of 
firm j is high. 
Principal i selects a dual option        ,         
    
   , which solves: 
                               
                      
            
                         
                      
         (3) 
subject to: 
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     , pour                    (WCi) 
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According to (4) the optimal compensation schemes of the duopoly and the monopoly firms 
are identical: the compensation is equal to zero under high cost and equal to the marginal 
cost of effort if the effort successfully reduces the firm’s cost.  By assumption 1 the level of 
effort of the agent in the duopoly case is strictly lower than 1. Note that uniqueness of the 
optimum  contract  is  an  immediate  consequence  of  the  convexity  of  the  cost-function. 
Hermalin  (1994)  showed  that  if  the  cost  function  is  linear                          at 
asymmetric equilibria may obtain. In the duopoly case at equilibrium one of the  owners 
proposes stronger incentives to his manager than the rival owner. Such a possibility is ruled 
out  in  our  case  because        is  convex.  The  unique  Nash  equilibrium  is  a  symmetric 
equilibrium, where the two principals offer the same contract to their agent and where both 
agents choose the same level of effort. 
2.4  Monopoly vs. duopoly 
In this section we compare the optimum level of effort provided by agents under monopoly 
and duopoly when the principal chooses the optimum compensation scheme. Under which 
conditions will agents exert more effort when agencies compete with each other, i.e. in the 
duopoly case?   9 
Let    and    be the equilibrium efforts under monopoly and duopoly respectively, and 
assume that assumption 1 is satisfied. We have:  
    
  
                 
    
       
                               
          if: 
  
    
       
                              (5) 
The managerial incentives and the manager’s effort increase in the duopoly case – compared 
to the monopoly case - if the following conditions are satisfied:  
1.                ,           (6) 
2.     
  
 
                 
                       (7) 
These  conditions  ensure  that  the  equilibrium  effort  in  the  duopoly  case  exceeds  the 
equilibrium effort in the monopoly case. This may happen in two situations. The first one is 
when                : the entry of an inefficient firm (high cost) reduces the gain of a cost 
reduction. Therefore, the competing firms have less incentive to reduce their production 
costs. Consequently, they offer lower incentives to their managers who exert a lower level of 
effort. In the second situation                : the entry of an inefficient firm (high cost) 
increases the gain of a cost reduction. In this case, the firm will offer stronger incentives if 
and  only  if  the  marginal  cost  of  the  effort  grows  at  sufficiently  rate                
  
 
                  
              . If this condition is not satisfied, firms are better off by proposing low 
incentives which will lead the manager to exert low effort. On the other hand if there is a 
strong increase of the marginal cost of effort, the owner’s implementation cost of effort 
becomes  larger  both  under  monopoly  and  duopoly.  The  entry  of  low-cost  firm  always 
reduces the gain of a cost reduction                 . Therefore the owner of the monopoly 
offers  stronger  incentives  to  his  manager  than  duopoly  owners.  The  reason  is  simple: 
Cournot competition reduces the output and consequently the gain of  a cost reduction. 
Owners are therefore less inclined to propose high compensation for a cost reducing effort 
and consequently managers’ efforts are weaker. As a result increased competition (in the 
form of duopoly vs. monopoly) has a negative effect on the manager incentives and on the 
effort level. 10 
3.  Experimental Design 
The  main purpose  of our experiment was to test the above  prediction, by comparing a 
monopoly situation to a duopoly situation, on the basis of a within subject analysis. We set a 
parametric version of the above model, for which we introduced additional simplifications in 
order to focus exclusively on incentive schemes and effort choices. Before presenting the 
predictions of the parametric version of our model, we outline the general feature of the 
experimental design.  
3.1  General features 
The  experiment  was  organized  in  the  experimental  laboratory  of  LEEM,  Montpellier, 
France2. In each session, 20 student-subjects were randomly assigned either to the role of a 
principal (player X in the instructions) or an agent (player Y). Participants were privately 
informed  about  their  assignment  which  was  kept  constant  over  the  whole  session.  No 
subject participated in more than one session.  In  total 240 students participated  in  the 
experiment (12 sessions × 20 subjects). All participants were involved both in the monopoly 
game and the duopoly game. Each session consisted therefore of two main sequences: in 
one of the sequences, participants played the monopoly game for 10 rounds and in the 
other sequence they played the duopoly game for 10 rounds. To control for ordering effects 
that could be induced by the introduction of the withdrawal of the competitive pressure, we 
ran two different treatments:  the Monopoly-Duopoly treatment (MD thereafter) and the 
Duopoly-Monopoly treatment (DM thereafter). We organized six sessions per treatment. In 
treatment MD, after the practice rounds, subjects started the monopoly sequence followed 
by the duopoly sequence. In the DM treatment the order of the sequences was reversed. 
Specific  instructions  were  provided  at  the  beginning  of  each  se quence.  Furthermore, 
subjects have to answer a short questionnaire that allowed us to check their understanding 
of the rules of the game. After the first sequence, there was a short break during which the 
instructions for the next sequence were distributed (see the Appendix). Subjects could not 
communicate with each other during the break distributed.  
Each treatment was preceded by a practice sequence. Because the duopoly game is much 
more complex than the monopoly game, we introduced the same practice sequence which 
consisted  of 5  monopoly  rounds  in  both  treatments.  This  allowed  us  to  check  whether 
                                                           
2 The computer program was realized by Dimitri Dubois. 11 
subjects had the same familiarity with the decision tasks in both treatments, and started the 
real game with the same understanding of the game. The practice rounds also allow to 
control for learning effects which could be very different according to treatments (Kagel and 
Roth, 1995). Indeed, by omitting the preliminary sequence, subjects  assigned to the MD 
treatment could more easily learn that those assigned to the DM treatment. 
Table 1: Experimental design 














At  the  beginning  of  each  round,  each  subject  in  the  role  of  a  principal  was  randomly 
matched with an agent. In each round of the duopoly sequence, each randomly formed 
player pair (a principal and an agent) was randomly matched with another pair (a principal 
and an agent). At the end of each round, new principal-agent pairs were randomly formed, 
and each such pair was randomly assigned to another pair. In the monopoly sequences, 
there  was  no  interaction  between  the  different  pairs.  Interaction  was  restricted  to  the 
principal and the agent of the same pair. Costs, payoffs, and outcomes were measured in 
ECU (experimental currency units). At the end of the experiment, each subject was paid in 
cash according to his cumulative payoff for one of the two sequences selected randomly 
(practice rounds were not paid out). 
In  each  round,  the  principal  could  either  be  in  a  good  state  (“Green  State”  in  the 
instructions) or in a bad state (“Blue State” in the instructions). As in the model, each round 
was divided into four stages: 
In stage 1, the principal offered a contract to his agent for the current round. To simplify the 
principal’s task, the contract offer only determined the agent’s payment ( ) for the “good 
state”.  The  principal  could  choose  any  contract  offer  ranging  from  6  to  108  ECUs,  with 
increments  of  6  units:                        .  Contract  offers  within  a  player  pair 
where common knowledge only to the player pair.  
In stage 2, the agent had to decide whether to accept or to reject the contract offer. In case 
of a rejection the agent’s payoff is zero and the principal is in the “bad state”.  12 
In stage 3 the agent who accepted the contract offer had to choose the probability   that 
the “good state” obtains for the pair. The possible values for   ranged from 9% to 99% by 
increments of 9%, i.e.                           . The  value  of    chosen  by the 
agent was not observable to the principal. To each possible value of   corresponds a cost of 
effort for the agent which is given in table 2.  In the fourth stage players were informed 
about the realized state (for each player in the duopoly case) and the realized individual 
payoff of each member of their pair.   Furthermore, at the  end  of  each  round, subjects 
received the following summary data: the principal’s contract offer, the agent’s acceptance 
decision, the realized state for the pair and the realized payoffs. Note that in the duopoly 
sequence the principal was also informed about the state realized for the rival pair. 
Table 2: The cost associated with each value of p 
p (%)  9  18  27  36  45  54  63  72  81  90  99 
C(p) (ECU)  0,2  1  2,2  3,9  6,1  8,7  11,9  15,6  19,7  24,3  29,4 
 
3.2  Parametric setting 
We set the following parameters in the experiment:               ,        ,        . We 
chose       , so that he cost of effort function is            . The monopoly profit is 
        in the “bad state” (high cost) and          if the “good state” (low cost). With 
these parametric settings the optimum compensation scheme offered by the principal in the 
monopoly case is                  , and the optimum level of effort chosen by the agent is 
        . Given the optimum compensation scheme, the agent earns zero if he rejects the 
offer. If he accepts the contract offer, his payoff depends on the realized state for his player 
pair.  He  earns            in  the  “good  state”  and         in  the  “bad  state”.  Table  3 
summarizes the various possible cases. 
Table 3: Agent’s and Principal’s payoffs under monopoly 
State 
Agent payoff in 
case of refusal 
Agent payoff in 
case of acceptance 
Payoff of the 
principal 
Good   0  w - C(p)  144 - w 
Bad   0  - C(p)  36 
 
The principal’s payoff depends on the sequence. In a monopoly round, he earns         in 
the “good state” and 36 in the “bad state”. In a duopoly round, principals’ profits depend not 
only on the state of their own pair, but also on the state of the rival pair. Table 4 summarizes 
the payoffs of the principal and the agent for each competing player pair identified as pair 1 13 
(P1) or pair 2 (P2). While the agents’ payoffs are the same as in the monopoly case, the 
principals payoffs depend on whether both firms are in the same state or not. We need to 
consider 4 possibilities: i) both firms are in the “bad state”: each one has a profit equal to 
         , ii) f both firms are in the “good state” : each one makes a profit of        .  One 
firm is in the “good state” and her opponent if in the “bad state”: the profit of the low-cost 
firm is            . Finally if the opposite situation, the high-cost firm’s profit is         
when her rival has a low cost. The optimum duopoly compensation scheme offered by each 
principal  is                   ,  and  the  optimum  effort  level  chosen  by  each  agent  is 
        .  Therefore,  our  model  predicts  that  the  entry  of  a  new  firm  on  the  market 
reduces the incentives proposed by the owner to his manager who adjust her level of effort 
towards a lower level. 
Table 4: Possible payoff in duopoly in the event of acceptance of the contracts 
State  Payoff of principal  Payoff of the agents 
P1  P2  Principal of P1  Principal of P2  Agent of P1  Agent of P2 
Good  Good  64 – w1  64 – w2  w1 - C(p1)  w2 - C(p2) 
Good  Bad  144 – w1  0  w1 - C(p1)  -C(p2) 
Bad  Good  0  144 – w2  -C(p1)  w2 - C(p2) 
Bad  Bad  16  16  -C(p1)  -C(p2) 
4.  Experimental Results 
In this section we present and discuss our main findings. All of our statistical tests require a 
5% rejection threshold of the null hypothesis. We make use of the following abbreviations: 
KS for Kolmogorov-Smirnov, MWU for Mann Whitney Unilateral test, Wilcoxon for Wilcoxon 
signed rank test, t-test for Student test.  M-MD identifies the monopoly sequence in the MD 
treatment. Similarly, D-MD identifies the duopoly sequence in the MD treatment. M-DM and 
D-DM are the obvious counterparts for the DM treatment. We start with the principals’ 
contract offers before presenting the agents’ decisions.  
4.1.  Contracts Offers 
In this subsection we summarize the principals’ decisions. The average contract offered by 
monopolistic principals is 55.6 in the MD treatment and 51.6 in the DM treatment, a non-
significant  difference  (MWU,  p-value=0.521)  and  which  does  neither  differ  from  the 
theoretical prediction, i.e. contract         (t-test p=0.474 for MD and p-value = 0.398 for 
DM). 14 
In the duopoly case, the average contract offer is 48.9 in the MD treatment and 45.3 in the 
DM treatment, a non-significant difference (MWU, p-value = 0.336). However average offers 
are significantly larger than the predicted contract         (t-test p-value=0.024 for MD 
and  p-value=0.041  for  DM):  they  exceed  the  predicted  contract  by  16.43%  in  the  MD 
treatment and by 7.86% in the DM treatment. 










Result 1: On average, principals offer larger payments in the monopolistic environment than 
in the duopolistic environment. 
 
Table 5 shows that the average contract in the monopoly sequence exceeds the average 
contract  offer  in  the  duopoly  sequence  for  each  of  the  six  groups  for  both  treatments. 
Principals propose a significantly larger compensation under monopoly than under duopoly 
in  both  treatments.  Indeed,  in  the  MD  treatment  the  average  contract  offered  by  the 
monopolistic  firm  is  significantly  larger  than  the  contract  offered  by  a  duopolistic  firm 
(Wilcoxon one-sided p-value=0.027). In the DM treatment the average duopoly contract is 
significantly lower to the one offered by the monopoly (Wilcoxon one-sided p-value = 0.027). 


































Training Sequence 1 Sequence 2
Treatment  MD  DM 
Sequence  Monopoly  Duopoly  Duopoly  Monopoly 
Prediction   54  42  42  54 
G1  63,8  (14,6)  61,4  (12,1)  47,9  (11,4)  56,5  (9,0) 
G2  48,4  (16,1)  46,0  (14,1)  50,3  (12,6)  57,1  (12,5) 
G3  56,1  (11,5)  47,2  (9,3)  41,0  (15,7)  41,6  (14,4) 
G4  57,0  (18,1)  47,8  (10,7)  44,5  (11,7)  56,8  (13,7) 
G5  55,0  (10,5)  48,8  (8,4)  46,7  (10,2)  46,9  (7,6) 
G6  53,3  (15,7)  42,2  (10,9)  41,3  (12,5)  50,8  (12,9) 
Total  55,6  (14,4)  48,9  (10,9)  45,3  (12,4)  51,6  (11,7) 15 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the average contract over time for each treatment. The 
figure clearly shows that by moving from the monopoly to the duopoly condition (period 10 
of the MD treatment), principals react immediately by offering a lower compensation to 
their agent.  Symmetrically, after switching  from the  duopoly to the monopoly  condition 
(period 10 of DM treatment), principals offer immediately a larger compensation to their 
agent. Furthermore over time the average contract offered by the monopolistic principal is  
significantly larger than the one offered by the principal exposed to competitive  pressure in 
the duopoly condition (MWU p-value<0,001 for M-MD vs. D-DM and p=0,002 for D-MD vs. 
M-DM). 
In  accordance  to  our  theoretical  prediction  we  observe  that  principals  propose  a  larger 
compensation to their agent (on average) in the monopoly condition than in the duopoly 
condition in both treatments. A reduction (increase) of the expected profit affects negatively 
(positively) managerial incentives. Principals react immediately to a change in their expected 
profit by revising their contract offers in the predicted direction.  
 
Result 2: Consistent with our theoretical prediction the expected surplus share is favorable to 
the  principal  in  the  monopolistic  environment.  However  in  contrast  to  our  theoretical 
prediction,  the  expected  surplus  share  is  more  favorable  to  the  agent  in  the  duopoly 
condition. 
Table 6: Agent’s Expected Surplus Share 
Treatment  MD  DM 
Sequence  Monopoly  Duopoly  Duopoly  Monopoly 
Predictions  33,3%  30%  30%  33,3% 
G1  47,9%  81,9%  71,4%  37,3% 
G2  33,8%  41,1%  50,5%  39,1% 
G3  38,2%  42,7%  34,9%  27,9% 
G4  42,8%  45,4%  38,0%  39,5% 
G5  36,5%  71,6%  42,0%  28,4% 
G6  37,7%  33,7%  32,4%  33,8% 
Total  39,5%  52,8%  44,9%  34,3% 
 
Table  6  shows  the  agent’s  expected  surplus  share  (ESS),  i.e.  the  agent’s  expected  net 
payment divided by the total expected surplus assuming that he chooses optimally the level 16 
of effort3. For the monopolistic firm, the agent’s ESS is 39.5% in the MD treatment and 
34.3% in the DM treatment, an insignificant difference (MWU p-value=0.229). However, the 
ESS is significantly larger than predicted by our model, i.e. 33.3% (t-test, p-value=0.016).  
In  duopoly  firms,  the  ESS  averages  52.8%  in  the  MD  treatment  and  44.9%  in  the  DM 
treatment, a non-significant difference (MWU p-value=0.336). But as for the monopoly case, 
the ESS is significantly larger than predicted i.e. 30% (t-test p-value<0.001). 
Finally, we also observe that the ESS is significantly larger in the duopoly environment than 
in the monopoly environment for both treatment (Wilcoxon one-sided p-value=0.027 for 
monopoly vs. duopoly in MD and in DM).  Compared to the equal split benchmark, the ESS is 
significantly lower than 50% in the monopoly case (t-test, p-value<0,001) but significantly 
larger that 50% in the duopoly case (t-test, p-value=0,006). 
We therefore conclude that in a monopolistic environment the expected surplus is shared in 
a way that favors the principal as predicted. However, when competition is introduced, the 
sharing of the expected surplus becomes favorable to the agent in contrast to the theoretical 
prediction. 
In summary, in spite of the reduction of the average payment in duopoly, this payment is 
larger than the predicted payment and the surplus sharing is more favorable to the agent. 
4.2.  Agents’ Decisions 
 
Table 7: Rate of acceptance of contracts 
Treatment  MD  DM 
Sequence  Monopoly  Duopoly  Duopoly  Monopoly 
Prediction  100%  100%  100%  100% 
G1  91,0%  100,0%  96,0%  99,0% 
G2  85,0%  82,0%  86,0%  97,0% 
G3  95,0%  96,0%  80,0%  83,0% 
G4  88,0%  96,0%  93,0%  92,0% 
G5  86,0%  85,0%  89,0%  95,0% 
G6  76,0%  88,0%  93,0%  88,0% 
Total  86,8%  91,2%  89,5%  92,3% 
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Table 7 shows the rates of acceptance of contract offers by agent-subjects. Theoretically all 
contracts should be accepted (since the participation constraint is always satisfied)4. Agents 
accepted 86.8% of the  monopoly contract offers in the MD treatment and 92.3% in DM 
treatment, a non-significant difference (MWU p-value=0.148).  The rate of acceptance of 
contracts offered by duopoly firms is 91.2% in  the MD treatment and 89.5% in  the DM 
treatment, which are not different (MWU p-value=0.627). But the key observation is that the 
rate of acceptance is not significantly different between the two sequences from the same 
treatment  (Wilcoxon  one-sided  p-value=0.248  for  monopoly  vs.  duopoly  in  DM  and  p-
value=0.207  for  monopoly  vs.  duopoly  in MD).  Approximately  10%  of  the  contracts  are 
rejected in each sequence, in accordance with earlier findings about contract offers ((Clark 
et al. (2010), Keser and Willinger (2000)). 
Result  3:  The  acceptance  probability  of  a  contract  offer  is  positively  affected  by  the 
introduction of competition but not by its withdrawal. 
 
We use a panel data regression in order to estimate the acceptance probability of a contract 
offer and to identify the variables that have a significant impact on the acceptance decision. 
The acceptance probability of subject i in period t is given by:  
                
   
      
where                                            
    is the payment of subject i in period t,     and   are the dichotomous variables which 
indicates  respectively  the  payment  variation  between  period  t  and  period  t-1  (1  if  the 
variation is strictly negative) and the sequence (1 for monopoly).    is a normally distributed 
random variable that captures the individual random effect and     is a standard random 
error term. The results of the random-effects panel regression are summarized in table 8.  
The Wald test shows that the models are globally significant.  
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Table 8: Logistic regression of the acceptance probability of contract offers 
Treatment  MD  DM 
Nb. obs.  1080  1080 
Dependent Variable  Acceptance probability 
Independent Variables  Coeff. (SD)  Coeff. (SD) 




















Wald χ²(3)=125.85, Prob>χ²=0.0000, Log likelihood=-211.551 for MD 
Wald χ²(3)=90.28, Prob>χ²=0.0000, Log likelihood=-215.072 for DM 
*** and ** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
An  increase  of  the  payment  has  a  positive  and  significant  impact  on  the  acceptance 
probability.  As  the  payment  variation  becomes  larger  (in  the  negative  domain)  the 
acceptance probability becomes lower. Indeed, the results indicate a positive relationship 
between  payment  and  acceptance  probability  in  both  experimental  treatments.  On  the 
other hand, a lower payment in the current period than the one offered in the previous 
period reduces the probability that the agent accepts the contract. The estimates also show 
that  the  sequence  dummy  is  significantly  and  negatively  correlated  to  the  acceptance 
probability  in  treatment  MD  but  not  in  treatment  DM:  by  switching  from  monopoly  to 
duopoly, with lower incentives, the probability that the agents accept the contract increases 
significantly,  while  moving  from  duopoly  to  monopoly,  with  higher  incentives,  does  not 
affect the acceptance probability.  Since agents accept lower payment in duopoly firms, they 
are sensitive to the competitive environment to which their principal is exposed.  
We suspect that the main reason why agents reject contract offers is that they expect a 
more favorable offer. This is confirmed by a Logit estimate of the reject probability of the 
contract offer as a function of the ESS. The results of the random-effects panel regression 




Table 9: Logistic estimates of the reject probability of contracts offers 
Treatment  MD  DM 
Nb. obs.  1200  1200 
Dependent variable  Reject probability 
Independent variables  Coeff. (SD)  Coeff. (SD) 










Wald χ²(1)=10.94, Prob>χ²=0.0009, Log likelihood= -309.997 for DM 
Wald χ²(1)=18.52, Prob>χ²=0.0000, Log likelihood= -390.216 for MD 
*** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%. 
 
The Wald test shows that the models are globally significant. An increase in the ESS has a 
negative  and  significant  impact  on  the  probability  to  reject  the  contract  offer.  This 
observation is in line with Anderhub et al. (2002) and Cochard and Willinger (2005) who 
found a similar result. Therefore, the agent’s decision to accept or reject is based on the 
comparison  of  his  net  payment  and  the  principal’s  payment:  if  the  principal’s  payoff  is 
comparatively too large the agent rejects the offer.  
Table 10: Average effort level in accepted contracts 
Treatment  MD  DM 
Sequence  Monopoly  Duopoly  Duopoly  Monopoly 
Prediction   90%  70%  70%  90% 
G1  60,2%  (18,0)  68,3%  (16,4)  69,4%  (13,2)  76,9%  (10,9) 
G2  60,8%  (15,5)  64,1%  (18,4)  64,7%  (18,0)  71,3%  (14,5) 
G3  70,4%  (12,0)  65,9%  (11,0)  55,5%  (14,5)  66,7%  (18,2) 
G4  71,5%  (21,1)  69,8%  (10,9)  66,3%  (16,7)  71,5%  (13,6) 
G5  79,6%  (6,4)  77,7%  (4,7)  74,8%  (10,4)  75,9%  (11,9) 
G6  70,5%  (12,5)  69,3%  (11,5)  67,7%  (8,7)  65,0%  (15,4) 
Total  68,8%  69,2%  66,4%  71,2% 
 
Table 10 shows the average effort level (and standard error) chosen by the agents after 
accepting a contract. In monopoly, the average effort is 68.8% in the MD treatment and 
71.2% in the DM treatment, a non-significant difference (MWU p-value=0.423) but these 
effort levels are significantly lower than the optimal effort, i.e. effort          for both 
treatments  (t-test  p-value<0.001  for  both  treatments).  In  duopoly,  the  average  effort  is 
69.2% in the MD  treatment and 66.4% in the DM treatment, which are statistically not 
different (MWU, p-value=0.521) nor from the theoretical prediction, i.e. effort          (t-
test p=0.344 for MD and p-value = 0.113 for DM). 20 
Result 4: The reduction of average payment after entry of a rival firm has no effect on the 
agent’s average effort level. On the other hand, the increase of the average payment after 
exit of the rival firm increases significantly the average effort level. 
The average effort level is not significantly different across sequences of the MD treatment 
(KS p-value=0.756). On the other hand, in the DM treatment the level of effort is significantly 
larger in the monopoly condition compared to the duopoly condition (KS p-value=0.049). 
The  analysis  of  the  evolution  of  the  average  effort  over  time  confirms  the  absence  of 
significant  differences  across  sequences  for  the  MD  treatment  (Wilcoxon  one-sided  p-
value=0.878), but a significant one in the DM treatment (Wilcoxon two-sided p-value=0.006).   
Therefore our data reflects an asymmetric reaction on the part of the managers: when the 
competitive pressure is relaxed, principals offer higher incentives because they have higher 
profit  expectations  and  managers  respond  by  providing  higher  effort.  However,  when 
competition  is  reinforced,  principals  offer  lower  incentives  because  of  reduced  profit 
expectations, but agents maintain their effort level.  
Figure 2: Average effort level according to average payment 
 
 
Result 5: For a given level of payment, agents work harder in the duopoly environment than 
in the monopoly environment. The effort level is positively correlated to the payment and 
negatively to the payment variation. 
Table 11 shows the results of a fixed-effects panel regression, with effort choice as the 























Table 11: Determinants of the choice of effort level 
Treatment  MD  DM 
Nb. obs.  962  983 
NB. of subjects  60  60 
Dependent variable  Effort 
Independent variables  Coeff. (SD)  Coeff. (SD) 




















Wald χ²(3)=288.28, Prob>χ²=0.0000, Log likelihood=-4134.539 for MD 
Wald χ²(3)=228.82, Prob>χ²=0.0000, Log likelihood=-4307.894 for DM 
*** and ** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
The results show that the effort level is strongly correlated to the contract payment in both 
treatments. For a given income, effort is significantly lower if the payment received in the 
previous period is higher than the payment in the current period. In contrast, if the payment 
is higher in the current period the agent increases her effort.  
The estimates show also that the sequence dummy is significant and negatively correlated 
with effort in both treatments: for the same payment, agents work harder in the duopoly 
environment than in the monopoly environment.  
Result 6: Agents tend to choose a level of effort that induces an equal sharing of the expected 
surplus between them and their principal, in both competitive conditions. 
Table 12 reports the average payment, the effort level and the observed expected surplus 
share of the agent (ESSo thereafter) for accepted contracts.  In contrast to the ESS the ESSo 
is calculated by taking into account the average effort level chosen by the agents and not the 
optimal effort level. The ESSo is not significantly different between monopoly and duopoly in 
both treatments (Wilcoxon one-sided p-value=0,463 for M-MD vs. D-MD and p-value=0,753 
for M-DM vs. D-DM). Consequently, agents choose effort levels for which they expect a fair 
share of the surplus. Indeed, the average ESSo is not significantly different to egalitarian 
sharing i.e.: 50% (t-test p-value=0,080 for M-MD, p-value= 0,130 for D-MD, p-value=0,677 
for M-DM p-value=0,996 pour D-DM). 22 





Finally, both when he decides to accept or to reject a contract offer and when he decides 
about the level of effort, the agent compares his net payment to the principal’s payment. He 
tends to refuse contract offers with unequal sharing and if he accepts a contract offer he 
tends to choose an effort level for which he expects an egalitarian sharing of the surplus 
with the principal. 
5.  Conclusion 
The question that we tried to answer in this paper is the following: how do firms revise the 
incentives that they offer to their manager as a response to increased (reduced) competition 
and how do managers react to such a change? Neither the theoretical nor the empirical 
literature  provides  satisfactory  answers  to  this  question.  The  theoretical  literature  is 
ambiguous:  several  effects  have  been  identified  but  the  combined  outcome  of  their 
interactions is unclear. The empirical literature is parsimonious and is confronted to obvious 
limitations  of  observability  of  the  relevant  data,  such  as  effort.  However  there  is  some 
consensus about the existence of a monotonic relation between competition, incentives and 
effort: increased competition either lowers the incentives and the effort or increases both of 
them. 
We contribute to the existing literature by providing experimental evidence on this issue. 
Our experiment is based on a simple model in which we compare a monopolistic firm to 
duopoly  firms  competing  “￠  la  Cournot”.  Each  firm  has  an  owner  (the  principal)  and  a 
manager (the agent). Principals offer contracts that pay a high bonus if the agent successfully 
reduces  the  firm’s  production  cost.  Agents  choose  a  costly  level  of  effort  (equal  to  the 
success probability), unobservable to the principal, in order to reduce the cost. 
Our key finding is that an increase of the competitive pressure (entry of a rival firm) reduces 
the  incentives  provided  by  the  principals  to  their  managers,  but  managers’  reacts  by 
Treatment  MD  DM 
Sequence  Monopoly  Duopoly  Duopoly  Monopoly 
Payment  58,6  50,2  46,8  53,1 
Effort  68,8  69,2  66,4  71,2 
ESSo  54,16%  55,24%  50,01%  48,99% 23 
maintaining their level of  effort instead of reducing it as predicted. This result tends to 
support  Hart’s  idea  of  substitutability  between  incentives  and  competition:  higher 
competition induces higher effort in spite of lower incentives. However we also find that this 
effect is asymmetric: when competition is reduced (exit of the rival firm), principals increase 
the incentives that they offer to their manager who increases his effort level.  
Our finding tends to support the hypothesis that managers internalize to some extent the 
principal’s concern about the competitive environment. Instead of adjusting simply their 
level  of  effort  to  the  incentives  implemented  by  the  principal,  managers  also  react  to 
increased competition. While they share thereby the principal’s objective, they are reluctant 
to accept unfair contracts. Indeed our data clearly shows that unfair contracts are rejected 
by agents, and when a contract is accepted agents adjust their effort level in such a way as 
to  equalize  the  expected  surplus  share  between  them  and  their  principal.  Therefore  as 
outside competition becomes more aggressive, managers are likely to maintain their efforts 
to reduce the firm’s costs despite lower incentives, provided that the surplus is shared more 
equally  with  the  firm  owners.  On  the  other  hand,  as  the  competitive  pressure  softens, 
managers care less about surplus sharing and respond to increased incentives by increasing 
their effort.  
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You are about to participate in an economic experiment on decision making. From now on, you are 
required to remain silent. If you have any question, please raise your hand, an assistant will answer 
your request.  
This  experiment  consists  of  three  sequences,  one  of  which  will  be  a  training  sequence.  20 
participants are in this room : 10 participants will be in the role of player X and the other 10 in the 
role of player Y. Roles will be attributed on a random basis at the beginning of the experiment. Your 
computer screen will inform you about your role. All participants will keep the same role all along the 
experiment,  that means for all three sequences. After each sequence there will a short break during 
which you will be required to remain seated in front of your computer. During the break, you will 
receive new instructions . You cannot discover the idendity of the persons with whom you will 
interact,  whatever  your  role.  You  will  be  able  to  communicate  with  the  other  participants  only 
through your computer interface.  
 
Payment for the experiment 
During the experiment gains and losses will be measured in ECU; At the end of the experiment, one 
of the two sequences will randomly selected.  The amount of ECU that you accumulated over the 
selected sequence will be converted into Euros. You may experience losses in some experimental 
rounds. However, the conversion rule of ECU’s into Euros guarantees that you cannot lose money in 
this experiment. The conversion rule of the accumulated ECUs into Euros is the following :  
     nt in Euros                  ount o  E Us    onst nt  
The value of the constant is unknown at the beginning of the experiment, even for the experimenter. 
This value will be determined at the end of the experiment, and will be announced to you. The 
constant can take a different value for X players and for Y players. However the constant will be the 
same for all X players. Similarly, all Y players will have the same value for the constant. If the amount 
of ECUs that you accumulated over the chosen sequence is larger than the constant you will earn 
more than 20 Euros. If it is less than the value of the constant, you will earn less than 20 Euros.  2 
Monopoly instructions 
You are about to start a sequence of 10 periods. In each period, each player X will be anonymously 
and randomly matched with a Y player. New (X,Y) pairs will be formed randomly after each period. 
E  h p ir   n  ith r b  in th  “Gr  n st t ” or th  “Blu  st t ”. Th  lik lihood that a pair is in the 
“Gr  n st t ” depends on the decisions of pl   r Y. In th  “Gr  n st t ” pl   r X   k s   l rg r 
pro it th n in th  “Blu  st t ” : i  th  pl   r p ir is in th  “’Gr  n st t ” pl   r X   rns 144 E Us 
whil  i  pl   r p ir is th  “Blu  st t ” pl   r X   rns 36 E Us. In order to obtain these profit levels, 
player X and Y need to sign a contract, by following 4 steps. The rest of the instructions describes 
each of these steps.  
Stage 1: Contract offer by player X : m 
 l   r X o   rs    ontr  t to pl   r Y b  whi h h  s ts th  p    nt to pl   r Y i  th  “Gr  n st t ” 
obtains for the pair. This payment (noted m thereafter) will be between 6 ECU and 108 ECU, by 
in r   nts o  6E Us. So pl   r X   n  hoos    = 6, 12, 18, …, 96, 102, 108. Th   ontr  t o   r d b  
player X to player Y within a player pair is known only by the members of the player pair.  
Stage 2 : Acceptance or rejection of a contract 
Player Y decides if he accepts or rejects the contract offered by player X. If he rejects the contract, 
the pair will necessarily end in th  “Blu  st t ”. In this   s  player Y earns 0 ECU and player X earns 
36 ECUs. The pair moves therefore directly to stage 4. 
Stage 3 : Choice of an action : p 
If player Y accepts the contract offered by player X, he  will have to choose an action (noted  p 
thereafter). The value of p corresponds to the chance of obtaining the « Green state » for the player 
pair. Action p can take 11 different values , from 9% to 99%, by increments of 9 units.  So, player Y 
can choose 9%, 18%, 27%, ..., 81%, 90% or 99%. Player X cannot observe the value of p chosen by 
player Y. To each value of p corresponds a cost (noted C thereafter) for player Y. The following table 
provides the cost, in ECUs, for each possible value of p.   
Table A3. 1 : Cost of effort for each value of p 
p (en %)  9  18  27  36  45  54  63  72  81  90  99 
C(p) (ecu)  0,2  1  2,2  3,9  6,1  8,7  11,9  15,6  19,7  24,3  29,4 
 
 
Stage 4 : Realization of the state and gains 
- Case 1 – the contract offer is rejected : If player Y rejects the contract offered by player X, the player 
pair is in the “Blu  st t ”, player Y earns 0 ECU and player X earns 36 ECUs.  3 
- Case 2 – the contract offer is accepted  : If player Y accepts the contract offered by player X, the 
state of the pair will be randomly determined. The computer system will draw a number between 0 
and 100. If the number drawn is smaller or equal to the value of p chosen by player Y, the player pair 
will be in the « Green state ». If the number drawn is larger than the value of p chosen by player Y, 
the pair will be in the « Blue state ». Whatever the state of the player pair, player Y will pay a cost 
 orr sponding to th   hos n v lu   or p. I  th  “Gr  n st t ” o  urs  or th  p ir, pl   r X   rns 144 
ECUs minus the payment (m) transferred to player Y, and player Y earns m (the amount transferred 
by player X) minus C (the cost corresponding to the chosen value for p). It th  “Blu  st t ” o  urs, 
player X earns 36 ECUs, and player Y looses C. The table below summarizes all possible gains for 
player X and player Y.  
Table A3. 2 : Gains in case of acceptance 
State  Gain of X  Gain of Y 
Green state  144 - m  m – C 
Blue state  36  -C 
 
 
History: At any time you can hit the « history » button to access the record of past periods.The 
histroy file shows for each past period : the period number, the decision of player X (the amount m),  
the decision of player Y (the value of p for a Y player and “    pt” or “r j  t”  or  n X pl   r), th  
realized state, the gain of the period and the cumulative gain since the beginning of the sequence.  
Example: Suppose that in stage 1 player X proposes m = 48 ECU to player Y. 
-  If player Y rejects the offer in stage 2, the pair is in the « Blue state », player Y earns 0 ECU and 
player X earns 36 ECUS. The pair goes to stage 4.  
-  If player Y acceptes the offer in stage 2, the pair moves to stage 3 where player Y has to choose an 
action p. Suppose that he chooses p = 54%. The cost corresponding to that value of p is C = 8.7 
ECUs. Therefore, there is a 54% chance that the « Green state » occurs and 46% chance that the 
« Blue state » occurs. If the « Green state » occurs for the player pair, player C earns 144 – 48 = 96 
ECU and player Y earns 48 – 8.7 = 39.3 ECUs. If the « Blue state » occurs, player X earns  36 ECUs 
and player Y looses -8.7 ECUs. For this example, the table below summarizes the possible gains in 
each state for each player in case of acceptance of the contract by player Y. 
-   
-  Table A3. 3 Gains in the example in case of acceptance 
State  Gain of X  Gain of Y 
Green state 
96 ecu 
(144 – 48) 
39,3 ecu 
(48 – 8,7) 
Blue state  36 ecu  -8,7 ecu 
-   
 4 
Duopoly instructions 
You are about to start a new sequence of 10 periods. You keep the same role as in the previous 
sequence. In each period of the sequence, each player X will be randomly and anonymously matched 
with a player Y. One all (X,Y) pairs are formed, each pair will be matched with another pair. For 
instance the pair (X1,Y1) will be matched with the pair (X6,Y6), the pair (X3,Y3) will be matched with the 
pair (X5,Y5), the pair (X8,Y8) will be matched with the pair (X2,Y2)… At the end of each period new (X,Y) 
pairs will be formed, and each one will be randomly matched again with another pair. In each period 
player X can make a profit that depends upon an action chosen by player Y of his player pair, the 
state that occurs for his player pair and the state that occurs for the other player pair with which the 
pair is matched.  
Each pair can eith r b  in th  “Gr  n st t ” or th  “Blu  st t ”. Th  lik lihood th t   p ir is in th  
“Gr  n st t ” d p nds on th  d  isions o  pl   r Y. In th  “Gr  n st t ” pl   r X   k s   l rg r 
pro it th n in th  “Blu  st t ”. Th  pro it o  pl   r X d p nds both on the state of his own pair and 
th  st t  o  th  oth r p ir with whi h it is   t h d.  I  both p irs  r  in th  “’Gr  n st t ”,    h 
pl   r X   rns 64 E Us . I  both p irs  r  in th  “Blu  st t ”    h pl   r X   rns 16 E Us. I  on  o  th  
p irs is in th  “Gr  n st t ” whil  th  oth r on  is in th  “’Blu  st t ”, pl   r X o  th  p ir in th  
“Gr  n st t ”   rns 144 E Us  nd pl   r X o  th  p ir in th  “Blu  st t ”   rns 0 E U. In ord r to 
obtain these profit levels, player X and Y need to sign a contract, by following 4 steps. The rest of the 
instructions describes each of these steps.  
Stage 1: Contract offers by players X : m 
Each player X offers a contract to player Y of his pair by which he sets the payment to player Y if the 
“Gr  n st t ” obt ins  or th  p ir. This p    nt (not d m thereafter) will be between 6 ECU and 108 
ECU, by increments of 6 ECUs. The contract offered by player X to player Y within a player pair is 
known only by the members of the player pair.  
Stage 2 : Acceptance or rejection of contracts 
Each player Y decides if he accepts or rejects the contract offered by player X of his pair. If he rejects 
th   ontr  t, his p ir will n   ss ril   nd in th  “Blu  st t ”. In this   s  pl   r Y   rns 0 E U  nd 
player X earns an amount that only depends on the state of the other pair. The pair moves then 
directly to stage 4. 
 
Stage 3 : Choice of an action : p 
If player Y accepts the contract offered by player X of his pair, he will have to choose an action (noted 
p thereafter). The value of p corresponds to the chance of obtaining the « Green state » for the 5 
player pair. Action p can take 11 different values , from 9% to 99%, by increments of 9 units.  So, 
player Y can choose 9%, 18%, 27%, ..., 81%, 90% or 99%. Player X cannot observe the value of p 
chosen by player Y. To each value of p corresponds a cost (noted C thereafter) for player Y. The 
following table provides the cost, in ECUs, for each possible value of p.   
Table A3. 4 : Cost of effort for each value of p 
p (en %)  9  18  27  36  45  54  63  72  81  90  99 
C(p) (ecu)  0,2  1  2,2  3,9  6,1  8,7  11,9  15,6  19,7  24,3  29,4 
 
Stage 4 : Realization of the states and gains 
- Case 1 – the contract offer is rejected : If in a pair player Y rejects the contract offered by player X  
th  pl   r p ir is in th  “Blu  st t ”, pl   r Y   rns 0 E U  nd the gain of player X depends only on 
the state that occurs for the other pair.  
 
- Case 2 – the contract offer is accepted  : If in a pair player Y accepts the contract offered by player 
X, the state of the pair will be randomly determined. Whatever the state of the player pair, player Y 
will pay a cost corresponding to the chosen value for p. The gains of the players depends on the 
states that occur in each pair.  
 
  If the two pairs are in the « Blue state », player X of each pair earns 16 ECUs and player Y of 
each pair looses C, the cost corresponding to the chosen value of p. 
  If one of the pairs is in the « Blue state » and the other one in in the « Green state » : 
  Pair in the « Blue state » : Player X earns 0 ECU and player Y looses C. 
  Pair in the « Green state » : Player X earns 144 – m ECUs, with m the  amount transferred to 
player Y of his pair. Player Y earns m – C, with m the  amount transfered by player X f his 
pair, and C  the cost corresponding to the value chosen for p.  
  If the two pairs are in the « Green state », player X of each pair earns 64 – m, with m the  
amount transferred to player Y in each pair, and player Y of each pair earns m – C, with m 
the  amount transferred by player X and  of his pair, and C  the cost corresponding to the 
value chosen for p by each one.  
Consider  two  pairs  -  P1  and  P2  -  matched  together  and  formed  by  players  X1,  Y1  and  X2,  Y2, 
respectively. Note m1 the amount proposed by X1 to Y1 and m2 the amount proposed by X2 to Y2. 
The table below summarizes all the possible gains for each player of each pair, depending on the 
realized state for each pair.  6 
 
Table A3. 5 : Gain possibilities in case of acceptance of contracts 
State  Gains of X players  Gains of Y players 
P1  P2  X1  X2  Y1  Y2 
Blue  Blue  16  16  -C  -C 
Blue   Green  0  144 – m2  -C  m2 - C 
Green  Blue  144 – m1  0  m1 - C  -C 
Green  Green  64 – m1  64 – m2  m1 - C  m2 - C 
 
 
At the end of a period each player can see on his computer screen the state that occured for his pair 
and his individual gain. X players are also informed about the state that occurred in the other pair.  
History: At any time you can hit the « history » button to access the record of past periods. The 
history file shows for each past period the following data : the period number, the decision of player 
X of his pair (the amount m),  the decision of player Y of his pair (the value of p for a Y player and 
“    pt” or “r j  t”  or  n X pl   r), th  r  liz d st t   or his p ir, th  g in o  th  p riod and the 
cumulative gain since the beginning of the sequence. X players can also see for each period, the state 
that occurred for the other pair.  
Example: Consider two pairs - P1 and P2 - matched together and formed by players X1, Y1 and X2, 
Y2, respectively. Note m1 the amount proposed by X1 to Y1 and m2 the amount proposed by X2 to 
Y2.  Furthermore note p1 the value of the action chosen by Y1 and p2 the value of the action chosen 
by Y2. Assume that X1 proposes m1 = 60 ECUs to Y1 and that X2 proposes m2 = 66 to Y2. Suppose 
that Y1 accepts the contract offered by X1 and chooses p1 = 63% (at a cost of 11.9 ECU), and that Y2 
accepts the contract offered by X2 and chooses p2 = 45% (at a cost of 6.1 ECU).The table below 
summarizes the possible gains for each player of each pair, depending on the realized state for each 
pair.  
Table A3. 6 : Gain possibilities for the example (contracts are accepted) 
States  Gains of X players  Gains of Y players 
P1  P2  X1  X2  Y1  Y2 
Blue  Blue  16  16  -11,9  -6,1 
Blue  Green  0  78 
(144 – 66)  -11,9  59,9 
(66 – 6,1) 
Green  Blue  84 
(144 – 60)  0  48,1 
(60 – 11,9)  -6,1 7 
Green  Green 
4 
( 64 – 60) 
-2 
(64 – 66) 
48,1 
(60 – 11,9) 
59,9 
(66 – 6,1) 
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